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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
.JOH~

A. ~Lt\.LIA, State Bank Con11ni~sion e r of th ~
State of Utah, a11d HERB~~l~ ' l., T .'\ YLOR, as Exam ·
iner in Chai~ge of the I_jiquidation ~of the Bank of
Heber City,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
J. HAROLD GILES AND JO·S IE BAIRD GILES,
Defendants and Appel1ants,
A. c. ~fOULTO·N AND E. DEvVEY lVIOULTON,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
\TERNOR E. BAIRD ~L\_ND MARY A. BAIRD, His
"' ife, J. RUI.JON MOl{G. A.K, J. RULON MORGAN
as the Surviving Partner of the Firm of ~lorgan &
~forgan, a Co-Partnership, ELIZABE'rH J.
BAIRD, B.ANIC OF HEBER Cirry, RULON F.
S'rARLEY, State Bank Comini ss i~oner of the· State
of Utah, and SPENCER C. TA YLC)R., as Examiner
in fiharg·e of Iji~niclRtion of the Bank of Heber City, 1410
ARTHUR D1J I{:B~ .A YD E1TT~EAN DUJ{E, I-Iis \Vife, Civil
RA.Y F , S~tfiTII .8:. .TORIE BAIRD GILES SMTTH
His Wife, AND J. HAROLD GILES,
·
Defendants and Appellants,
J. RUIJON MOR.GAN;
Cross-Complainant,
vs.
R1TLON F. START.JEY, as Bank Com1nissioner of
the State of Utah, and SPENCER C. TAYI..JOR, as
Examiner in Charge of the ljquidation of the Bank
of Heber City,
Cross-Defendants.

Appellants' Brief on Respondents' Petition

for

Reh~arit1g

'ELI.LI\.S HANSEN ; J. R,Ul..JON ~10RG 1\N,
Attorn eys for Defendants and Appellants
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
JOHN .A.. MALI...t\., State Bank Cnunnissioner of the
State of Utah, and HERB~~R'P T .\ YLOR, as Exa1a·
iner in C'harge of the Liquidation ·of the Bank of
Heber City,
Plaintiffs and Rt. spondents,
1

v~.

J. HAROLD GILES

JO·SIE BAIRD GILES,
Defendants and App~ellants,
.A.. C. l\IOULTO·N AND E. DEWEY ~IOULTON,
vs.
Plaintiff8 and Respondents,
\~ERXOR E. BAIRD AND MARY A. BAIRD, His
"\Vife, J. RlJLON l\10RGAN, J. RULO·N MORGAN
as the Surviving Partner of the Firm of ~forgan &
Morgan, a Co-Partne1·ship, ELIZABETII J.
B. t\.IRD,
.
B.A.NT~ OF HEBER CITY, RUL.ON F.
srrARLEY, State Bank Con1missi~oner of the State
of Utah, and SPENCER- C. T.A. YLC,R, as Examiner
in Charg·e of Lic..~..n1idation of the Bank of Heber City, 1410
..
ARTHl"'"R. D1~I(E A~D ElTI~E_A.N Dl1 TCE, His '\Vife, ·civ il
RAY F. S:JIITH ~:JOSIE B:AJR-D GILES S1v!TTH
His Wife, AND J. HAROLD GILES, ·
Defendants and Appellants~
J. RUIJON MORGAN)
Cross-Complainant,
vs.
RUIJOX F. STARI.JEY, as Bank Commissioner of
the State of Utah, and SPENCER C. TAYLOR, ·as
Examiner in Charge of the I.Jiquiclation of the Bank
of Heber City,
Cross-Defendants. 1
AND

Appeal From Fourth District, 'Vasatch County.
Honorable Dallas H. Young, Judge.

Appellants' Brief on Respondents' Petition
for Rehe~r1ng
.A.n examination of the brief in sup·port of the petition for rehearing and a re-examination of the
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original briefs filed in this cause, show that there
is nothing of substance in the brief in support of
a rehearing that w.as no~t discussed at length in the
original briefs. We huv\rever deem it advisable to
brie·fly answer the latest argument of respondents.
On page two of their brief criticism is made of the
statement in the opinion heretofore rendered \vhere
it is said that
'~there is no evidence in the ease that
\\~r).uld justify the -be·lief that Mr. Giles \Vas
authorized to sig:n his wife's name to any
instrument.''
. .-\n examination of the evidence shows that this
Court "\Vas absolutely right in making the foregoing
statement. The-re is not in this entire record a
scintilla of evidence that shows, or 'tends to sho\v,
that prior to or after the transaction here involved
·Mr. Giles ever signed or "\Vas ever authorized to sign
his wife's name to any written instrument.
lt is the apparent position of resp·ondents that hecause Mr. Giles operated his wife's farm and used
the water represented by the ce,rtifica.tes of stock
belonging to his wife, he there hy acquired a right
to mortga.ge or sell the farm and wateor stock. The
fact that Josie's husband operated the farm and
cared for her sheep does not justify the conclusion
that Mr. Giles had either apparent or implied auth!ority to hypothecate the shares of \Vater stock.
''Apparent authority or ostensible authority, as it is also called, is that "'.vhich, though
not actually granted, the principal kno\\"ingly pPrmits tl1e agent to exercise, or
'vhich he holds himself out as possessing.''
2 Am. Jur. 83, a.nd cases there cited.
"The apparent or implied authorit~r of an
agent cannot he so extended a.s to permit
l1irn. to rlenart from the usual manner of
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accomplishing ''"hat he is employed to effect. Nor can he enlarge hiS' powers by
unauthorized representations and p·romises. . . . Moreover the apparent authority fur 'vhich the p.rincipal may be liable
n1ust be traceable to hin1 and cannot be established solely by the actions and conduct
of the agent; the princip~al is. :only liable
for that appearance of authority caused
by himself. . . . Furthermore, a party
dealing with an ag.,ent must prove that the
facts giving eolor to the agency were known
to hiln "'"hen he dealt w·ith the agent and
that he believed the agent "\vas acting within
his authority. If he ·has no knowledge of
such facts he does not act in relian~e upon
them and is in no position to claim anything
on account of them.''
;-. ~'"""\..
"m . J ur. 8f"'t:>.
~

''Authority conferred on an agent to sell,
though accompanied 'vith the possession of
the property to be sold, confers no actual
or ostensible authority to apply or transfer the property in pa~rrne·nt of his oWn
deht, and one who so takes the property,
though in good faith, cannot ordinarily
hold the same against the principal.''
2 Am. ,Jur. 97.
"It is also accepted, that an agent is
not authorized to pledge the property,
goods or securities of his principal merely
because he is authorized to sell them.''
2 Am. Jur. 98 .
.An application of anv one of the roregoing principles to the facts in thi~ eaRe "ill defe·at the claim
of the bank to a lien on the '""a.ter Rtock in question.
All of the evidence affirmatively shows that Harold
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Giles did not have authority to hypothecate the
stock; nor is there any evidence which calls for the
app~lication 1of the doctrine of implied or ostensible
authority of an ag'ent to bind the principal, or thBt
the hank relied upon anything that J·osie had done
,o,r failed to do which was calculated to mislead the
bank into the belief that Mr. Giles,.·had authority to
hypothecate the stock. The note which the bank
claims is secured by the stock, is the note of Mr.
Giles. Moreover, the language of
R. S. U. 1933, 18-3-1
provides that a certificate of capital stock in a corporation may he transferred only,
" (1) By delivery of the ce-rtificate endorsed either in blank or to a specified person by the person appearing by the certificate to be the owner of the shares represented thereby or
(2) By delivery of the certificate and a
separate document containing a written
assignment, and the assignment or a
power of attorney to sell, assign or transfer the same or the shares represented
therPhy, signed by the person app~earing
hy the certificate to he the ovmer of the
shares represented thereby. Such assignInrnt or po,vPr of attorney n1ay be either
in blank or to a specified person.''
The foregoing provisions are as clear as the English language can make them to the effect that
shares of stock cannot be transferred by pa:rol.
The owner of the stock must si~n his name, Indicat.ing an intention to dispose thereof or s:ome interest
therein. In ~nch particular the transfer of sto(llc is
~imilar to the transfer of re.a] estate. ln the ab~~nrP of a "rritten jnstrum~nt signpd by the party
to he bound, an att(~mpted transfer is a nullity.
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Such provisions dispose of the claim of the bank to
a lien on Certificate No. ti~. Josie Baird (Giles) was
the o'vner, and apparent O\vner, of that certificate.
She did not endorse that certificate. She n1ade no
'vritten assignment thereof nor gave to anyone a
power of attorney to transfer the srune.
It is argued that other provisions of Chapter 3 tend
to modify the provisions of Section 18-3-1. Vv. . e can
:find no language in the other sections of that chapter " . .hich sup·port such contention. 'fhere are other
pl'ovisions of the chapter ,,. .hich may defeat a claimant to stock even though there has been a. compliance with Section 18-3-1. 'Under the pro,·-isions of
Section 18-3-7
there is granted the right to rescind notv.. ithstandmg there has been an endorsement
''where the endorsement or delivery was
procured by fraud or duress or if the delivery of a certificate··,Yas. made 'vithout authority from the O\\-rner, unlPss the certificate has ~een transferred to a purchaser
for value in g~ood faith '"ithout notice of
any fact n1aking~ the transfer \Vrongful, or
the injured person has elected to ~vaive the
injury or has been guilty of laches in endeavoring to enforce his rightR. ''
As to Certificate No. 64 it 'vill be noted that under
the provision of
R. S. U. 1933, 18-3-7
Josie had a right to rescind the action of her husband unless the bank "ras a purchaser for value in
good faith without notiee of any facts making the
transfer wrongful, or unless she elected to \vaive
the injury or was guilty of laches in endeavoring
to enforce her right.
The opinion of thi~ Conrt to the effect that the bank
had notice of facts that preclude the said bank
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from claiming that it acted in good faith is in accord with the repeated holdings of this Court and
with the law as announced by the authorities generally. One who has n~otiee or knowledg:e of facts
which if followed up would lead to the acquiring
of knowledge of the ultimate fact, may not claim
that he was 'vithout knowledge of such ultimate fact.
Reese-Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142;
158 P. 684.
Salt l;ake City v. Salt Lake Investment
Co. 43 Utah 183; 134 P. 603.
Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 2'44; 158 P. 426.
\Vright v. Bailey, 45 Utah 584; 147 P. 899.
The bank was familiar with the signatures of both
Mr. and 1\tirs. Giles . They both dre\V checks. on the
l:>ank. The bank is thus chargeable with knnv;ledge
of the fact 'that the signature on one of the certifieates was not the signature of Mrs. Giles. the o'vner
of the stock. There \Vas no \vitness to the purported
signature of Josie Blaird Giles on either of the certificates. The two certificates were delivered to the
bank at the san1e time. If such facts did not put the
'bank on ·notice that there was probably something
wrong about the right of Giles to hypothecate the
stock, it is difficult to conceive of a state of facts
short of actual knowledge that would have tha;t
result.
The cases of Brown v. Wright and Garfield Banking Co. v. Argyle cited by respondents recognize
the general rule. The facts in those cases are. so
unlike the facts in this case that neither of them
lends support to the claim that respondent hank
'vas a purchaser in g ood faith without notice of the
lark of authority of J\!r. Giles to hypothecate the
stock. nor is there anv evidence in this case tending
to show that Josie waived her right to the stock
1

/

~
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freed fr"~oru the clain1ed lieu of the bank or that she
.
\Yas gu1lty of any laches.
\\hen she 'returned to
Utah soon after she learned fron1 her rnother that
the bank held the stock, Bhe "\vent to the bank and
\vas informed that the stock \Yas held by the Federal Reserve Bank. She then went to the Federal
Reserve Bank and asked to see the certificates but
the bank informed her that they were in the vault
and she could not see them. She then infor1ned the
bank that she had never signed the certificates.
Tr. 235; Ab. 168.
Keither the Federal Reserve Bank nor the Bank ot
Heber City loaned ru1y money on the ceTtificates
after Josie informed them of her claim to the stock
freed from any clain1 <of the banks. Respondents
seem to claim son1ething because Josie did not
make a formal demand for the certificates. Having
asked for and been denied the opportunity to see
the certificates, and having informed th(l hank that
she did not sign the same~ such stateinents clearly.
constituted notice to the hank that she claimed the
certificates. Moreover, a demand \vould haYe been
usele~s and therefore unnecessary.
The la~N does
not require the doing of a useless thing·.
VanDyke v. Ogden Savin~·s Bank, 48 Utah
606: 161 P. 50.
Pool v. 1fotter, 55 Utah 288; 185 P. 714.
f\tnliDings et ux v. Nielsen ct al, !2 Utah
169 : 129 p. 619 .
Obrecht v. I_Jand and ''Tater Co-., 44 Utah
270; 140 P. 117.
The statement is made on pagr four of respondents~
brief that "it mav he held "Tithout nndue stretchino·-, of the facts that Jo~de (}jles and her 'husband,
liarold Giles, were partners; . . . tl1at Mr. Giles
had full power to handle all property and busjness of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Josie; . . . that borro,ving n1oney on security was
a regula.r practice of Harold Giles from the day oi
marrying Josie Baird in 1924 to the time of their
divorce in 193'4. ''
The evidence does not sup:port those statements.
So f·ar as appears, Harold never at any time eithef
before or after the transaction here involved boTrowed any money on the security of J osi~ 's p ro11erty. We do not know just wha£ is mea11~· hy the
staten:ent that it does not require an undre strt~h·Jt
iu,g Of the facts to COnclude that ,JOSle anc her hu~
band Harold were partners. It certainly would require an undue stretching of the evidence to find
that a p~artnership existed bet,v~~·:~a J.o~ie and IInrold. All that can be said under thE- evidenee i:-; that
IIarold operated the property belonging," to ,Josic in
about the same manner as any hus.band operf'tes the
property belonging to his wife where the hi1shand
is and the wife is not a farmer. It is quite apparent that ,Josie did not regard Harold as having R!lJ
right to her property. When she sold her home and
loaned the money to Harold she took a note as evidence of the loan.

It is s-aid on page six of respondents' brief that because there was the follo,ving notation on the back
of the note which Harold gave to Josie, '' $1505.35,
Bank-7th October,'' tha.t.itberefore Josie had complete knowledge of Hafiold 's dealings. That Josie
knew that H.a.rold horro,ved money from the bank
is not questioned, but to say that she knew that
Harold had hypothecated the stock, !is to ignore the
evidence and engage in ·pure sp·eculation.
Contrary to the statement made by respondents on
pag1e six, it 'vas $1500.oo· and not $1505.35, that "Tas
paid to the bank on October 7, 1929. In any event,
the fact that Harold paid s:ome of the money loaned
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to hin1 by his 'vife, on hi~ note at the bank does not
even remotely tend to sho'\v that Josie authorized
or knew that Harold had hypothecated he.r stock
as security for the loan.
The inquiry is made on page seven of respondents'
brief, ''Why did she take a note from her husband,
Harold Giles~'' The answer to such inquiry is
obvious. She took the note the same a.s any other
person loaning money takes a note, naJnely, as evidence of the loan made to her husband and with the
hope that sometime he would}repa.y the money thus
loaned to him.

Touching case No. 1410 Civil, it is again argued that
George B. Stanley was not the attorney for Josie
Baird Giles (Smith) and that the interest of Vernor
E. Baird was and is not adverse to the interest of
the Moultons. It is true that ·~fr. Stanley testified
that Vernor employed him. However, he prepared
the documents for both Vernor a.nd Josie. The
mere fact that \ 1 ern or made the arrangements with
Mr. Stanley is not of controlling importance. Obviously Vern or could act for himself and Josie
in employing an attorney to draw up the necessary
documents to consummate the deal. The relation
of client and attorney may be 1created by contract
'vhich is implied, as well as express.ed. The services
rendered by Mr. Stanley were as much for tl1e benefit of Josie as for Vernor. Moreover, as we poi:nted
out in our original brief (pages .43 and 44) if Mr.
Stanley was not the aQ"ent for .Tosie, the note and
1nort~a.ge were nP,rer. deHvered -never hecame the
obligation of Vernor and no action can he maintained thereon.
On pag-e eight. of l"PRnondents' brief it i~ rontendeit
that this Court " .. fl ~ in error '"'hen it said that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'' Geor~g~e B. Stanley placed his clients'
property in the hands of third parties, to
the clients' detriment.''
RespondentR then proceed to argue that there was
no conflict of the interests of Vernor E. B:aird and
the 1foultons. Such statement is made in the face
of the fact that the M.oultons in this very suit sought
judgment against ''Vernor E. Baird ruH.l Mary A.
Baird his wife, for the principal suin of $15,000.00,
tog1ether with interest thereon at the rate ~of seven
percent p~er annum f~om October , 10, 1934 uritil
paid. For the further sum of $750.00 as and for
attorne~ys' fees,'' for the foreclosure of the Inortgage, and ''for judgment a.nd execution against the
defendants Vern or E. Baird and Mary A. Baird his
wife, for any deficiency which may remain after
applying all of the proceeds fro1n the sale ·of said
premises, water rights .and water stock properly
applicable to the satisfaction of plaintiffs' judgment.''
l t 'vould indeed he a ne\v doctrine, to hold that there
is no conflict of interest between plaintiffs Yvho seek
such a judgment and a defendant who may he com·
pelled to satisfy such a judgment. B·ut it is said
on page nine of respondents' brief that it was stipulated before the trial commenced that no de.ficiency
judgment \vould he taken in the matter. We repeat
what we snid in our original brief, that there, was
no such stipulation~ hut apparently plaintiffs' counsel realized that it would he unconscionable to receive full p·ayment of a n1ote for $15,000.00 principal
and s.everal years·' interest when such note \vas bi.d
in for only $100.00. No such generosity was shown
when the note was purchased and ''ThPn the suit
was brought, and the only reraRonable concluRior
permissible under the facts disclosed by this record
is that no such concession "\\Ta,s ~iven beea.use o.f a
deRire to accord to any of the defendants fair play
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but \\Tas done in an atten1pt to eoYer up if possible,

what ha.d theretofore been done.
\Vhen Plaintiff Addison C. ~foulton was being cross
examined at the trial, he stated that he did not
make any bid beyond $100.00, and ""ould have been
a "damn fool" to bid against himself." (Tr. 396;
Ab. 207).
On page nine of respondents' brief it is urged that
because Josie signed a note as security for her husband, that therefore Mr. Stanley was at liberty to
disregard his obligation to both ·vernor and Josie.
This too is a doctrinP \Yithout support either in la·w
or good morals. Nor \Yill either Josie or Harold be
released from paying their hone.st obligations by
reason of the opinion heretnforp render0d 1)y this
Court~

exception is also taken to the sta~e
ment of the Court's opinion \vhert:in it said that.

In their

brief~

'T

"but for the acts of Mr. Stanley, ~rnor
Baird's obligation to his sister would have
been p'eaceably settled.''
The evidence sho\VS such statP1nent b) Le 1n accor·(1
with the fact. Josie and Vern or ha.d, according to
all the evidence, agreed upon a settle,ment. ·vernor
was to have his note returned to him, and the property and water stock was to he conveyed to their
n1other. It is further sHid that
''there is nothing in the record to show they
were not peaceably settled.''
No excepti10n is or can be sureessfully taken to the
further lan,gnage in the opir)ion of the Court "rhere ..
in it is said:
''Instead the Bairds are forced throu.g·h a
law suit with strangers to the transartion,
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simply because the attorney upon 1.Vhom
Mr. Baird relied, instead of looking after
his client's interest~, hy taking advantage
of certain legal processes, placed his client's property in the hands of third partie~
to the client's detriment."
It might well be added that if the present clients of
l\lr. Stanley shall prevail, Vernor Baird ma:y
well be called upon to res1)(•nd iu damages because
of the warranties contained in the deed which he
executed and delivered to hi8 rnother.
It is finally suggested that because Vernor Baird
"\Vas out with sheep and did not return until s·oonetime after the trial began, that therefore '' Vernor
had no interest in the trial and the other defendants
\VC·.:-~ hopeful thPt h0 mig bt ~ho'v up to testify for
them.'' Here again respondents seem to contend
that Vernor V\"as not at all concerned as to whether
or not his agreement with Josie and his mother
Ehould be held for naught; whether a deficiency
judgment which might run into thou~ands of dollars might be rendered against him and his \Vife,
or whether he should be compelled to make good the
warranties contained in the deed t0 his mother.
If Vern or was SIQI dumb a.s to be unconcerned about
such matters it would seem a proceeding a~:ainst
him could he had only through a guardian. "f\Vp had
always understood the law to be that a party litig'ant haB a right to appear hy couns~l and if such
a party finds it impossible or inconvenient, or if
for any other re,ason he choose's not to attend court
throughout the trial, s11 c:h fact is not evidence that
his cause should fail.
Respondents are like,vise in ~rror when they say on
page ten of their brief that George B. Stanley \vas
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still representing \ ~ernor .B.J. Baird on :b,el>ruary 3,
1938. Mr. Stanlev testified, 'fr. 402 · Ab. 209: ''I
~
'
do not kno"" "'"hether I 'vas his attorney on February 3, 1938, because the work V/as not done at
his request but for his benefit. He con1e to get the
deeds. '' The fact that Vernor called for a tleed
does not, in the light of the evidence in this case,
justify the conclusion that ~Ir. Stanley \\ aa not the
attorney for \""ernor in the transaction here Jnvolved. Mr. Stanley admits that he 'vas.
7

In their brief, on page nine thereof, respondents
again criticise the action of J. Rulon Morgan for
preparing the documentS' necessary to .consummate
the agreement theretofore had between Josie, Vernor and his mother- In our original brief we have
discussed this phase of the case, and no useful pur·
pose can be served by enlarging upon 'vhat is there
stated.

The vetition for rehearing should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,

ELIAS HANSEN,
J. RULON MORG_J\.N,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants.
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